Packagist · contao/core-bundle
Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions
RequestTokenListener is the only generic REQUEST_TOKEN validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an act parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.
An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future key= action inherits it.
Honest bound. The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a key= action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.