medium

CVE-2026-111763

Maven · org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-parent

Summary

A2A Java SDK send client credentials under server-controlled HTTP header name, enabling leakage via redirect

Severity
medium
EPSS
0.1% (p3)
CWE
CWE-522
Also known as
GHSA-9rhm-2h4x-jwmx
Published
2026-10-20
Updated
2026-10-20

Advisory details

Impact.* A malicious or compromised A2A agent can cause the client's API key credential to be forwarded to an arbitrary third-party server. The agent serves an AgentCard with an APIKeySecurityScheme specifying a custom header name, then responds with an HTTP redirect. The JDK HttpClient follows the redirect and forwards the custom header containing the credential, since only the standard Authorization header may be stripped on cross-origin redirects.

Where. client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java:69 in intercept

What. The apiKeySecurityScheme.name() field from the remote agent's AgentCard (untrusted, server-controlled data) is used directly as the HTTP header name when placing client credentials. Combined with JdkA2AHttpClient's followRedirects(NORMAL) policy, credentials under custom header names survive cross-origin redirects (only Authorization is stripped on newer JDKs), allowing a malicious agent to leak client credentials to third-party servers. Additionally, AuthInterceptor does not check that location==HEADER before placing the credential as a header.

Exploit scenario. Client configures an API key credential for agent's security scheme myAuth. The malicious agent returns an AgentCard where securitySchemes includes myAuth as APIKeySecurityScheme with name='X-Leaked-Cred' and location=HEADER. AuthInterceptor places the credential in the X-Leaked-Cred header. The agent responds with HTTP 302 redirect to https://evil.com/collect. JdkA2AHttpClient follows the redirect, forwarding all custom headers including X-Leaked-Cred to evil.com. The attacker captures the client's credential.

Preconditions.

Fix. Validate the APIKeySecurityScheme.name() field against a whitelist of safe header names. Check that apiKeySecurityScheme.location() equals Location.HEADER before placing the credential as a header. Consider using followRedirects(NEVER) and implementing manual redirect handling that strips all authentication headers on cross-origin redirects.

Verification. 2/3 lens verifiers confirmed.

References

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.