RubyGems · decidim-verifications
Decidim: Verification admins can access supplied IDs from other organizations
The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.
The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.
Reproduction steps:
http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/newA tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666
Disable the "Identity documents" verification
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
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