crates.io · surrealdb
SurrealDB: Edge PERMISSIONS FOR delete bypassed when a connected node is deleted
In SurrealDB, records can be connected as a graph: a RELATE statement creates an edge record between two node records. If either endpoint node is deleted, SurrealDB automatically removes the edge row to keep the graph consistent.
A user with permission to delete a node could also delete the edges connected to that node, even when the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause should have stopped them.
The automatic edge removal (Document::purge_edges) ran with permissions disabled (opt.clone().with_perms(false)), so the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete and PERMISSIONS FOR select clauses were never consulted. The removal step could also observe edge state that the edge's SELECT clause should have hidden.
What an attacker can do:
PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause.PERMISSIONS FOR select should have hidden, as a side effect of the same edge-removal step.What it can't do:
DELETE on (the edge removal only runs from an authorised node delete).Document::purge_edges now propagates the caller's permission context into the edge removal. Each connected edge DELETE is evaluated against the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause, matching a direct DELETE.
Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.
DELETE permission to principals trusted to delete all connected edge records.PERMISSIONS is load-bearing for multi-tenant separation.Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.