NuGet · Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint
Steeltoe's env sanitizer misses connection strings — leaks embedded DB passwords
The Sanitizer component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (password, secret, key, token, .*credentials.*, vcap_services) does not cover the standard .NET pattern ConnectionStrings:<name> or Steeltoe Connectors' Steeltoe:Client:<type>:Default:ConnectionString. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded Password= and user:pass@host segments are returned verbatim in /actuator/env responses.
Any caller who can reach /actuator/env can receive connection strings containing plaintext credentials. Those credentials enable direct connection to the backing database, bypassing the application tier.
ConnectionStrings:* or *:ConnectionString keys.env is added to Management:Endpoints:Actuator:Exposure:Include. This is not the default./cloudfoundryapplication/env path is accessible to any authenticated CF user with read_basic_data permissions (Space Auditor and above) regardless of the exposure configuration.If an immediate upgrade is not possible:
env from the actuator exposure list..*connectionstring.* to KeysToSanitize as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths.Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.