Go · gogs.io/gogs
Gogs has Stored XSS in `.ipynb` Preview
Although .ipynb previews are sanitized on the server side via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb, the inserted content is re-rendered on the client side without sanitization using marked() on elements with the .nb-markdown-cell class. During this process, links containing schemes such as javascript: can be regenerated.
As a result, when a victim views an attacker-crafted .ipynb file and clicks the link, arbitrary JavaScript is executed in the Gogs origin, leading to a click-based Stored XSS.
After the rendered output of a .ipynb file is sanitized via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb and inserted into the DOM, only the Markdown cell portions are re-rendered using marked() and overwritten in the DOM. During this process, links with the javascript: scheme can be regenerated.
templates/repo/view_file.tmpl:42–71
{{else if .IsIPythonNotebook}}
<script>
$.getJSON("{{.RawFileLink}}", null, function(notebook_json) {
var notebook = nb.parse(notebook_json);
var rendered = notebook.render();
$.ajax({
type: "POST",
url: '{{AppSubURL}}/-/api/sanitize_ipynb',
data: rendered.outerHTML,
processData: false,
contentType: false,
}).done(function(data) {
$("#ipython-notebook").append(data);
$("#ipython-notebook code").each(function(i, block) {
$(block).addClass("py").addClass("python");
hljs.highlightBlock(block);
});
// Overwrite image method to append proper prefix to the source URL
var renderer = new marked.Renderer();
var context = '{{.RawFileLink}}';
context = context.substring(0, context.lastIndexOf("/"));
renderer.image = function (href, title, text) {
return `<img src="${context}/${href}"`
};
$("#ipython-notebook .nb-markdown-cell").each(function(i, markdown) {
$(markdown).html(marked($(markdown).html(), {renderer: renderer}));
});
});
});
</script>
While regular HTML pages (including .ipynb preview pages) are served without a Content Security Policy (CSP), CSP headers are applied only to attachment delivery routes.
internal/cmd/web.go:323
c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
As the attacker, add and push/commit a .ipynb file containing a javascript: link in a Markdown cell to a repository.
Example (PoC):
{
"nbformat": 4,
"nbformat_minor": 2,
"metadata": {},
"cells": [
{
"cell_type": "markdown",
"metadata": {},
"source": [
"[poc](javascript:alert(document.domain))"
]
}
]
}
The victim opens the file on Gogs (e.g., /<user>/<repo>/src/<branch>/poc.ipynb).
poc link displayed in the preview, alert(document.domain) is executed in the same Gogs origin.Attacker: Ability to place a .ipynb file as a regular (non-admin) user
Victim: Permission to view the repository (a click is required).
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.