Go · gogs.io/gogs
Gogs has an Open Redirect via redirect_to
An open redirect vulnerability exists in Gogs where attacker-controlled redirect_to parameters can bypass validation, allowing redirection to arbitrary external sites.
All redirects in Gogs that are validated via the IsSameSite function are vulnerable:
func IsSameSite(url string) bool {
return len(url) >= 2 && url[0] == '/' && url[1] != '/' && url[1] != '\\'
}
The function only inspects the first two characters of the URL string. This check fails to account for directory traversal sequences followed by backslashes. For example:
/a/../\example.com
The IsSameSite function checks the input supplied to the redirect_to query parameter value /a/../\example.com and considers it valid.
Because web browsers normalize backslashes \ to forward slashes /, the normalized URL becomes //example.com.
The normalized URL becomes:
//example.com
Resulting in a cross-origin redirect.
This affects all endpoints using the redirect_to query parameter, including login and other post-action flows.
redirect_to query parameter that redirects a user to a site the attacker wants them to visit:http://192.168.236.132:3000/user/login?redirect_to=/a/../\example.com
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.