high

CVE-2026-53518

npm · @better-auth/oauth-provider

Summary

@better-auth/oauth-provider's OAuth authorization-code grant allows concurrent redemption when two token requests race the find-then-delete primitive

Severity
high
CVSS
8.1
EPSS
0.4% (p34)
CWE
CWE-294, CWE-362, CWE-367
Also known as
GHSA-7w99-5wm4-3g79#@better-auth/oauth-provider
Published
2026-07-07
Updated
2026-07-07

Advisory details

Am I affected?

Users are affected if all of the following are true:

Fix:

  1. Upgrade to @better-auth/oauth-provider@1.6.11 or later. If developers use the legacy plugin paths from better-auth/plugins, upgrade better-auth to 1.6.11 or later.
  2. If developers cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.

Summary

The OAuth provider's POST /oauth2/token endpoint, on the authorization_code grant, redeems a single-use authorization code through a non-atomic find-then-delete sequence. Two concurrent requests with the same code value both pass the read step before either delete completes, then both proceed to PKCE verification and createUserTokens. Each surviving request mints a fresh access token, refresh token, and id token. RFC 6749 §4.1.2 requires authorization codes to be single-use; this primitive does not enforce that under concurrency.

Details

The same architectural primitive (find a single-use verification row, then delete it, then trust the row to authorize) is used in 20 other call sites across the codebase. The deletion primitive returns Promise<void>, discarding the row count surfaced by adapter.deleteMany, so no call site can detect "another caller already claimed this row". The fix lands at the primitive layer rather than at any individual call site.

The fix introduces a claimVerificationByIdentifier primitive at the internal-adapter layer that performs an atomic claim-and-return, replaces the find-then-delete pair at this call site, and migrates the highest-impact variant sites in the same release.

Patches

Fixed in @better-auth/oauth-provider@1.6.11 and better-auth@1.6.11 for the legacy oidc-provider and mcp plugin paths. All three token-exchange call sites now consume the verification row through internalAdapter.consumeVerificationValue, an atomic claim primitive that deletes the row and returns its prior value in one operation. The first request to arrive takes the row and mints tokens; concurrent racers observe an empty result and return invalid_grant.

Error-code consistency is also tightened on the @better-auth/oauth-provider token endpoint: the malformed-verification-value branches previously returned a project-specific invalid_verification code, which is not part of RFC 6749 §5.2's response error set. Both branches now return invalid_grant so spec-compliant clients can branch on the standard code without a special case.

Workarounds

None of these close the bug fully without a code patch. Upgrading is the only good path.

Impact

Credit

Reported by @chdanielmueller.

Resources

References

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.