PyPI · gemini-bridge
gemini-bridge vulnerable to arbitrary local file read via consult_gemini_with_files inline mode
consult_gemini_with_files in inline mode read any file path supplied in
the files argument without confining it to the working directory, then
forwarded the contents to the Gemini CLI. Because the caller also controls
query, the file contents are echoed back through the Gemini round-trip
(and sent to Google), making this an arbitrary local file read.
An MCP client — or an LLM that has been prompt-injected into calling the tool —
can read any file the server process can access (SSH keys, cloud
credentials, .env, source) and have it disclosed via the tool response.
No code execution by itself.
consult_gemini_with_files(query, directory, files, …), mode="inline"_read_file_for_inline via _prepare_inline_payload in src/mcp_server.pyat_command mode already confined paths; inline mode did not._resolve_path returned an out-of-root path while only nullifying the display
name, and _prepare_inline_payload read the file regardless. Absolute paths,
.. traversal, and symlink escapes were all accepted.
Fixed in 1.3.1. _resolve_path now resolves symlinks and confines via
Path.relative_to(root); inline mode skips any entry that resolves outside the
working directory (the same guard at_command already enforced).
Upgrade to 1.3.1. Before upgrading, avoid mode="inline" with untrusted
files input, or run the server with a restricted-permission user.
Reported privately by Zhihao Zhang (WPI).
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.