medium

CVE-2026-63336

Maven · com.rabbitmq:amqp-client

Summary

RabbitMQ Java client: TrustEverythingTrustManager used by default in useSslProtocol() enables MITM

Severity
medium
EPSS
0.3% (p23)
CWE
CWE-295
Also known as
GHSA-5m9f-rphj-c435
Published
2026-08-18
Updated
2026-08-18

Advisory details

Vulnerability Summary

com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY TLS certificate (including null chains) and is used as the default trust manager when calling ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol() without arguments. Combined with hostname verification being disabled by default, this enables trivial man-in-the-middle attacks.

Affected Components

POC (Verified on Java 21, amqp-client 5.25.0)

// TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY certificate including null
TrustEverythingTrustManager tm = new TrustEverythingTrustManager();
tm.checkServerTrusted(null, "RSA");  // No exception — accepts null cert chain
tm.getAcceptedIssuers();  // Returns empty array — trusts all CAs

// ConnectionFactory defaults
ConnectionFactory factory = new ConnectionFactory();
factory.useSslProtocol();  // Uses TrustEverythingTrustManager internally
// enableHostnameVerification() NOT called by default

// Credential exposure
factory.setPassword("secret_password_123");
factory.getPassword();  // Returns "secret_password_123" — no redaction

// Default plaintext port
factory.getPort();  // 5672 (plaintext, not 5671/TLS)

// PLAIN SASL sends cleartext credentials
PlainMechanism pm = new PlainMechanism();
// handleChallenge() sends username+password in cleartext

Attack Scenarios

  1. MITM: Attacker presents self-signed cert → TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts it → all RabbitMQ traffic intercepted
  2. Credential theft: Default plaintext port (5672) + PLAIN SASL = credentials readable on network
  3. DNS rebinding: No hostname verification → attacker DNS record → MITM without cert
  4. Logging exposure: getPassword() returns plaintext → credentials in logs/stack traces

Suggested Fix

  1. Deprecate TrustEverythingTrustManager — it should never be used in production
  2. useSslProtocol() should use the JVM default trust store, not TrustEverything
  3. Enable hostname verification by default
  4. Redact password in getPassword() or remove the public getter
  5. Warn when using PLAIN SASL without TLS

References

Related advisories

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.