crates.io · postgres-protocol
postgres-protocol: Unbounded SCRAM iteration count allows a malicious server to cause CPU-exhaustion denial of service
A malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle server can supply an arbitrarily
large SCRAM-SHA-256 PBKDF2 iteration count during authentication. The client
runs it inline with no upper bound, pinning a tokio worker thread for minutes
per connection, possibly stalling the whole async runtime.
Applications that connect only to a trusted database are not exposed; the risk applies to clients that may connect to untrusted or user-supplied servers, or whose connection can be intercepted by a man-in-the-middle.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.