critical

GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86

npm · 9router

Summary

9router has unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats

Severity
critical
CVSS
10
CWE
CWE-200, CWE-306, CWE-862
Published
2026-07-06
Updated
2026-07-06

Advisory details

title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true

Summary

Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.

Affected Endpoints

Endpoint Method Issue
/api/providers GET Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs
/api/providers/:id GET Read any single provider detail (IDOR)
/api/providers POST Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys
/api/providers/:id PUT Modify any existing provider connection
/api/providers/:id DELETE Delete any provider connection
/api/usage/stats GET Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data
/api/usage/request-logs GET Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider)
/api/usage/request-details/:id GET Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses
/api/version GET Exposes current version info
/api/models GET Exposes full model routing catalog
/api/v1/models GET Exposes model list

Impact

Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication

An attacker can:

  1. Add a malicious provider — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router
  2. Modify existing providers — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic
  3. Delete all providers — cause complete denial of service
  4. Read all provider configurations — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses

Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats

The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., sk-...) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts.

Critical: Conversation history leak

/api/usage/request-details returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Unauthenticated read of all providers

curl -s https://<host>/api/providers

Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes.

2. Create a provider without authentication

curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}'

Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and isActive: true.

3. Modify an existing provider without authentication

curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}'

Returns the updated connection object.

4. Delete a provider without authentication

curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid>

Returns {"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}.

5. Read full usage stats with API keys

curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats

Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests.

6. Read request logs

curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50"

Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts.

7. Read full conversation

curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid>

Returns complete conversation turns for that request.

8. Read version info

curl -s https://<host>/api/version

Returns {"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}.

Root Cause

The Next.js API routes under src/app/api/* lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically:

Suggested Fix

  1. Add authentication middleware to all /api/providers/* routes (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE)
  2. Add authentication middleware to all /api/usage/* routes
  3. Never return full API key strings in any API response — return masked keys only
  4. Never return GitHub Copilot tokens or similar OAuth secrets in API responses
  5. Implement proper authorization checks so users can only access their own data
  6. Add rate limiting to public endpoints

Resources

References

Related advisories

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.