GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8

Summary

etcd: Watch API authorization bypass via open-ended range requests

Severity

high

CWE

CWE-863

Published

2026-07-24

Updated

2026-07-24

Advisory details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

A user granted READ permission on a single, exact key can use the Watch gRPC API with clientv3.WithFromKey() (an open-ended, "from this key to the end of the keyspace" watch) to receive watch events for every key lexicographically greater than or equal to their permitted key — not just the one key they were granted.

This is an authorization bypass in etcd's RBAC enforcement for the Watch API; Range/Get and DeleteRange requests are not affected. It only affects clusters with authentication enabled — clusters running without auth already allow unrestricted read access.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

This vulnerability is patched in the following versions:

• etcd 3.7.1
• etcd 3.6.14
• etcd 3.5.33

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

If upgrading is not immediately possible, the following mitigations reduce exposure:

• Audit READ grants. Any READ grant — even on one key — can be leveraged via Watch to read everything after it. Review who holds READ permissions and revoke/tighten any you wouldn't trust with full read access.
• Restrict network access. Limit which hosts can reach etcd's client (gRPC) port via firewall rules or network policy, reducing who can attempt exploitation.

Reporter

• Luis Toro (@lobuhi on Github)
• Anthropic and Adam Korczynski (@AdamKorcz on Github)

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/security/advisories/GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/commit/6643f80602461a6095c9b294b6512fd9719bef41
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/commit/afeaa624da19085b47fb5ccc7c22a8c421bc2eae
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/commit/e863b001bbf3367003a543aa3099db9892134cd7
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases/tag/v3.5.33
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases/tag/v3.6.14
• https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases/tag/v3.7.1

Related advisories

• GHSA-6vch-q96h-7gc3 — high · Go/go.etcd.io/etcd/v3
• GHSA-cxf3-9h37-7rr8#github.com/labstack/echo/v5 — critical · Go/github.com/labstack/echo/v5
• GHSA-cxf3-9h37-7rr8#github.com/labstack/echo/v4 — critical · Go/github.com/labstack/echo/v4
• CVE-2026-77366 — critical · npm/obsidian-tc
• CVE-2026-77459 — critical · Go/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2
• CVE-2026-68582 — critical · Go/code.vikunja.io/api
• CVE-2026-105851 — critical · npm/payload
• CVE-2026-100721 — critical · npm/vm2

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