See what Stateward catches
No demo gate. Below are two findings shaped exactly like the ones Stateward posts on your pull requests — a code vulnerability and a dependency risk — annotated so you can see the reasoning, not just the verdict.
SQL injection via string interpolation
Untrusted req.params.id is interpolated into a query. An attacker can read or destroy the database.
const rows = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [req.params.id]);A code vulnerability, caught inline
What it flagged
Untrusted req.params.id interpolated straight into a SQL string — a classic injection. Stateward traces the tainted value from the route handler to the query sink across the call graph, so it fires even when input and sink live in different files.
The fix it proposes
A parameterized query with a bound parameter — committable as a one-click suggestion, not just advice. The finding explains why the original is exploitable, not only that it is.
How it maps to compliance
Tagged CWE-89 and OWASP A03 (Injection) automatically, so the same finding doubles as audit-ready evidence for SOC 2, NIS2 and DORA — no separate reporting step.
A risky dependency, before it ships
Stateward checks every dependency in a change against known CVEs, typosquatting and maintainer risk — and tells you whether the vulnerable code is actually reachable from your app, so you fix what matters instead of drowning in transitive alerts.
Vulnerable dependency: axios@1.4.0
Server-side request forgery in the bundled follow-redirects. Fixed in 1.7.4.
- "axios": "1.4.0"
+ "axios": "1.7.4"Built to be trusted with your code
Read-only & ephemeral
Stateward can comment, but never pushes, merges or stores your keys.
EU-sovereign hosting
Code and security data stay EU-hosted via Citadea — built for NIS2, DORA and the CRA.
Whole-codebase aware
Reasons over your call graph and trust boundaries, not just the diff.
Stateward is in beta and onboarding design partners. Built by Yggdrasil Digital.