PyPI · openbabel
Open Babel has out-of-bounds write (overlapping memcpy) in zipstream basic_unzip_streambuf::underflow
A memory-safety vulnerability in Open Babel's bundled zipstream
decompression code caused an out-of-bounds write via overlapping
memcpy when reading a crafted gzip-compressed chemistry file.
The flaw was in basic_unzip_streambuf::underflow. The decompression
buffer refill path invoked memcpy with overlapping source and
destination regions, which is undefined behavior and produced
out-of-bounds writes in practice. Any file format read through the
gzip-wrapped reader was a potential trigger.
Open Babel is a C++ library and CLI used to read and write chemistry
file formats; it is shipped by Linux distributions and embedded in
services that may parse untrusted input. Triggering this vulnerability
requires the victim to open a malicious gzip-compressed chemistry file
with the obabel tool, the OBConversion API, or any of the language
bindings (Python, Ruby, Java, R, Perl, C#, PHP).
All releases up to and including 3.1.1.
3.2.0 (released 2026-05-26).
Fix commit: https://github.com/openbabel/openbabel/commit/d4621d41 Originally reported as #2832; fixes consolidated in #2913.
A minimized reproducer for this CVE is checked in under
test/files/fuzz_regress/ and is exercised on every CI build under
ASAN+UBSAN by the fuzzregresstest harness.
Reported via OSS-Fuzz.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.