CVE-2026-52799

Summary

In Gogs 0.14.1, GET /attachments/:uuid returns the raw attachment file without verifying whether the requester has view permission for the associated Issue/Comment/Release or the repository. In a test environment with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false, we confirmed that an unauthenticated user can download attachments belonging to a private repository.

Description

/attachments/:uuid retrieves an attachment record solely by the UUID provided in the URL and returns the corresponding local file without performing any authorization checks against the attachment’s parent object (Issue/Comment/Release) or the repository it belongs to. As a result, even attachments under private repositories can be downloaded by an unauthenticated user (or a user without proper permissions) as long as the UUID is known.

Relevant code (internal/cmd/web.go:306):

m.Get("/attachments/:uuid", func(c *context.Context) {
	attach, err := database.GetAttachmentByUUID(c.Params(":uuid"))
	if err != nil {
		c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get attachment by UUID")
		return
	} else if !com.IsFile(attach.LocalPath()) {
		c.NotFound()
		return
	}

	fr, err := os.Open(attach.LocalPath())
	if err != nil {
		c.Error(err, "open attachment file")
		return
	}
	defer fr.Close()

	c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
	c.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public,max-age=86400")
	c.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`inline; filename="%s"`, attach.Name))

	if _, err = io.Copy(c.Resp, fr); err != nil {
		c.Error(err, "copy from file to response")
		return
	}
})

The UUID lookup itself also performs no validation tied to repository visibility or user permissions. Authorization is not enforced at this layer.

Relevant code (internal/database/attachment.go:124):

// GetAttachmentByUUID returns attachment by given UUID.
func GetAttachmentByUUID(uuid string) (*Attachment, error) {
	return getAttachmentByUUID(x, uuid)
}

Preconditions

• The attacker knows the target attachment’s UUID (i.e., the attachment URL).
• For unauthenticated exploitation: [auth] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false.
• Even when REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true, exploitation may still be possible because the handler does not check repository-level permissions; a user who can log in but lacks access to the target repository may still retrieve the attachment.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Log in as an administrator and create a private repository, e.g. myadmin/idor-attach-1770724346-1a13bb.
2. Add an attachment to an Issue in that repository and note the attachment UUID (example UUID used during testing: f06d90f8-5b62-4c10-ac8d-f11fdf870b57).
3. Log out and access the following as an unauthenticated user:

• The repository page → 404 Not Found

• The Issue page under that repository → 404 Not Found

• GET /attachments/<uuid> → the attachment file is successfully downloaded

Minimum Required Privileges

• REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false: none (works without authentication).
• REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true: only the ability to log in (repository view permission is not required in practice).

Impact

• Confidential information attached to private repositories or restricted Issues/Releases may be disclosed.

  • Examples include credentials, cryptographic keys, personal data, internal documents, or unpublished source code fragments.

• While the severity depends on the attachment contents, attachments frequently contain sensitive data, making the potential impact high.