CVE-2026-59832

Reporter: Cavan Loughran, Celvex Group Inc.

Summary

The /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go performs a bare filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) on the single-decoded c.Request.URL.Path and serves the result with c.File(), with NO IsSubPath containment and NO IsSensitivePath denylist - unlike the sibling /export/ (serveExport) and /appearance/ (serveAppearance) handlers, which both carry IsSubPath, and unlike /assets/ (serveAssets), whose traversal was fixed in GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664. Because util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets, an authenticated request to GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json resolves to WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json and leaks the kernel API token and AccessAuthCode (the same secret file CVE-2026-30869 leaked from /export/); GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db leaks the full document database.

Affected versions

v3.6.5 and current master (verified by direct source read). The /export/ and /assets/ fixes were endpoint-scoped and never reached serveSnippets.

Technical detail

Sink, kernel/server/serve.go, serveSnippets (verbatim, current master and v3.6.5):

func serveSnippets(ginServer *gin.Engine) { ginServer.Handle("GET", "/snippets/*filepath", model.CheckAuth, func(c *gin.Context) { filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/snippets/") if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) { if "conf.json" == filePath { c.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized) return } } ext := filepath.Ext(filePath) name := strings.TrimSuffix(filePath, ext) confSnippets, err := model.LoadSnippets() ... for _, s := range confSnippets { if s.Name == name && ("" != ext && s.Type == ext[1:]) { c.Header("Content-Type", mime.TypeByExtension(ext)) c.String(http.StatusOK, s.Content) return } } // when not matched in the config file, look it up on the filesystem filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) // <-- TAINTED join, no containment c.File(filePath) // <-- arbitrary workspace file read }) }

Taint path, end to end:

1. Route GET /snippets/*filepath is registered with the single middleware model.CheckAuth (authentication only; NO CheckAdminRole).
2. c.Request.URL.Path is the request path AFTER Go net/http has percent-decoded it ONCE. The kernel runs gin.New() with default settings (UseRawPath = false, UnescapePathValues = true) and installs NO path-sanitizing middleware (the global ginServer.Use(...) chain is ControlConcurrency, Timing, Recover, corsMiddleware(), jwtMiddleware, gzip, sessions only - none cleans or rejects ..). net/http does not path.Clean URL.Path for gin handlers, so a single-encoded %2e%2e arrives at the handler as a literal .. segment.
3. filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/snippets/") yields the attacker-controlled remainder, e.g. ../../conf/conf.json.
4. The non-admin guard checks only "conf.json" == filePath; with traversal the value is "../../conf/conf.json", so the guard does not fire (and admins are not checked at all).
5. The config-snippet name/ext loop does not match a traversal string, so control falls through to the filesystem branch.
6. filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath): Go's filepath.Join runs Clean, which RESOLVES .. segments. Clean("WorkspaceDir/data/snippets" + "/../../conf/conf.json") = WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json. There is no IsSubPath confinement, so the resolved path escapes the snippets root.
7. c.File(filePath) streams the resolved file to the response body.

Directory layout (confirmed by kernel/util/working.go): WorkspaceDir/ data/snippets/ = util.SnippetsPath (the /snippets/ base) conf/conf.json <-- API token + AccessAuthCode (the secret) temp/siyuan.db <-- full SQLite database From util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets the climb-out is exactly two levels:

• GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json -> WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json (kernel API token, AccessAuthCode, cookie signing material - the same secrets CVE-2026-30869 leaked).
• GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db -> WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan.db (the entire document database).
• GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd (and deeper) reaches host files outside the workspace; c.File serves any path Clean resolves to, subject only to OS file permissions.

Incomplete-fix lineage (patch-diff)

SiYuan has been fixing path traversal in file-serving handlers ONE endpoint at a time:

• /export/ (serveExport): CVE-2026-30869 (IsSensitivePath denylist, v3.5.10), then CVE-2026-41894 / GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872 (double-encode bypass, v3.6.5). Now has IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, fullPath) + IsSensitivePath.
• /appearance/ (serveAppearance): hardened alongside; has IsSubPath(appearancePath, filePath).
• /assets/*path (serveAssets): GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664; delegates to model.GetAssetAbsPath (containment) + publish-access check.
• /snippets/*filepath (serveSnippets): NONE. NO IsSubPath, NO IsSensitivePath; only a literal "conf.json" string match for non-admins, defeated by traversal. The fixes that closed /export/ and /assets/ were endpoint-scoped (per-handler IsSubPath/IsSensitivePath/GetAssetAbsPath) rather than a shared request-level path-confinement primitive applied to every c.File/http.ServeFile sink. serveSnippets was never touched. It reaches the SAME secret file (conf/conf.json) the parent CVE-2026-30869 was filed for, at a LOWER bar in one respect: it needs only single URL encoding (no double-encode trick), because there is no containment check to bypass in the first place.

Privilege / reachability (stated honestly)

The route is gated by model.CheckAuth only (any authenticated user), NOT CheckAdminRole. CheckAuth admits any principal that presents a valid API token (Conf.Api.Token), a valid session whose AccessAuthCode == Conf.AccessAuthCode, or BasicAuth. The handler's own if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) branch confirms non-admin reachability; that branch only blocks the literal string "conf.json", which the traversal payload "../../conf/conf.json" does not match, so even non-admins leak the secret file. SiYuan supports non-admin authenticated roles (RoleEditor, RoleReader) in shared/published workspace modes, plus access-auth-code logins. Privilege required: PR:L (a valid authenticated session), NOT pre-auth and NOT admin-gated. Reading conf/conf.json yields the admin API token/AccessAuthCode, letting a non-admin escalate to full kernel-admin API control; siyuan.db leaks all note content. The kernel HTTP server is the published interface for self-hosted/Docker deployments (AV:N).

SiYuan's SECURITY.md excludes arbitrary file WRITE outside the workspace as a non-issue, but this finding is arbitrary file READ of in-workspace secrets (conf/conf.json, siyuan.db) and host files. Read-side traversal of conf.json is exactly what CVE-2026-30869 was accepted for, so this is squarely in scope.

Non-destructive: no weaponized exploit is included; the chain is described in prose for the maintainer to reproduce.

Secondary (reported for completeness, not the headline): serveRepoDiff (/repo/diff/*path) shares the same bare filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "repo", "diff", requestPath) + http.ServeFile with NO containment, so .. in requestPath escapes TempDir/repo/diff. BUT it carries model.CheckAdminRole (admin-only), so the trust boundary crossed is weak (an admin already holds the API token). Lower severity; shares the same one-line fix.

Impact

Authenticated (non-admin, PR:L) arbitrary workspace file read: kernel API token + AccessAuthCode (conf/conf.json), the full document database (siyuan.db), and host files outs