Summary
Hurl: Cookies in Cookies section leak when redirecting to a different host
Advisory details
The Bug
Hurl <= 8.0.1 lets you define cookies two ways in a .hurl file:
- As a raw Cookie: header in the [Header]/headers area
- In a dedicated [Cookies] section (parsed into RequestSpec.cookies)
When following a redirect to a different host, Hurl correctly strips security-sensitive data (Authorization, Cookie header, and basic-auth user) to avoid leaking credentials cross-host — mirroring libcurl's default behavior. But it only stripped the cookie that came in as a header. Cookies declared in the [Cookies] section were carried over to the new host unchanged — a credential-leak bug.
Hurl file that leaks cookies:
GET http://localhost:8000/follow-redirect-basic-auth?change_host=true
[Cookies]
fruit: lemon
HTTP 200
Hurl file that doesn't leak cookie:
GET http://localhost:8000/follow-redirect-basic-auth?change_host=true
Cookie: fruit=lemon
HTTP 200
Patch
With Hurl <= 8.0.1, user can use Cookie header instead of the dedicated [Cookies] section.
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7w2g-9mf9-324m
- https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/hurl/security/advisories/GHSA-7w2g-9mf9-324m
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63481
- https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/hurl/pull/5119
- https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/hurl/commit/ed91c894c2cf11704422010554037e3ba70b446e
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