Summary
Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node
Advisory details
============================================================================= Security Advisory elttam
Topic: Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node
Module: FlowiseAI/Flowise
Disclosed: 24-Apr-2026
Credits: Alex Brown
Affects: FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2
I. Background
Flowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications—such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents—through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding.
Flowise allows users to connect to a local SQLite database for record management of Upsert Vector Store operations.
II. Problem Description
The database path for the "SQLite Record Manager" node could be overridden using the additionalConfig input, as demonstrated in the following code snippet.
class SQLiteRecordManager_RecordManager implements INode {
...
async init(nodeData: INodeData, _: string, options: ICommonObject): Promise<any> {
const _tableName = nodeData.inputs?.tableName as string
const tableName = _tableName ? _tableName : 'upsertion_records'
const additionalConfig = nodeData.inputs?.additionalConfig as string <1>
const _namespace = nodeData.inputs?.namespace as string
const namespace = _namespace ? _namespace : options.chatflowid
const cleanup = nodeData.inputs?.cleanup as string
const _sourceIdKey = nodeData.inputs?.sourceIdKey as string
const sourceIdKey = _sourceIdKey ? _sourceIdKey : 'source'
let additionalConfiguration = {}
if (additionalConfig) {
try {
additionalConfiguration = typeof additionalConfig === 'object' ? additionalConfig : JSON.parse(additionalConfig)
} catch (exception) {
throw new Error('Invalid JSON in the Additional Configuration: ' + exception)
}
}
const database = path.join(process.env.DATABASE_PATH ?? path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise'), 'database.sqlite') <2>
const sqliteOptions = {
database,
...additionalConfiguration, <3>
type: 'sqlite'
}
const args = {
sqliteOptions,
tableName: tableName
}
const recordManager = new SQLiteRecordManager(namespace, args)
;(recordManager as any).cleanup = cleanup
;(recordManager as any).sourceIdKey = sourceIdKey
return recordManager
}
}
<1> The additionalConfig input was user controllable.
<2> The intended SQLite database path.
<3> Keyword argument expansion of the additionalConfiguration variable after the database variable, which allows overwriting the preceding database setting.
An attacker could abuse this weakness to write an SQLite database to an arbitrary filepath, which includes system directories since the flowiseai/flowise:3.1.2 Docker image runs as root.
However, unlike the Flowise RCE via SQL Database Chain Node vulnerability, the executed SQL query was not user controllable and the tableName input was validated to match the /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/ regex pattern, as shown in the following code snippet.
class SQLiteRecordManager implements RecordManagerInterface {
...
sanitizeTableName(tableName: string): string {
// Trim and normalize case, turn whitespace into underscores
tableName = tableName.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '_')
// Validate using a regex (alphanumeric and underscores only)
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(tableName)) { <1>
throw new Error('Invalid table name')
}
return tableName
}
...
async createSchema(): Promise<void> {
const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()
try {
const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()
const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName) <1>
await queryRunner.manager.query(` <2>
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "${tableName}" (
uuid TEXT PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT (lower(hex(randomblob(16)))),
key TEXT NOT NULL,
namespace TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
group_id TEXT,
UNIQUE (key, namespace)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS updated_at_index ON "${tableName}" (updated_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS key_index ON "${tableName}" (key);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS namespace_index ON "${tableName}" (namespace);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS group_id_index ON "${tableName}" (group_id);`)
// Add doc_id column if it doesn't exist (migration for existing tables)
const checkColumn = await queryRunner.manager.query(
`SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM pragma_table_info('${tableName}') WHERE name='doc_id';`
)
if (checkColumn[0].count === 0) {
await queryRunner.manager.query(`ALTER TABLE "${tableName}" ADD COLUMN doc_id TEXT;`)
await queryRunner.manager.query(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS doc_id_index ON "${tableName}" (doc_id);`)
}
await queryRunner.release()
} catch (e: any) {
// This error indicates that the table already exists
// Due to asynchronous nature of the code, it is possible that
// the table is created between the time we check if it exists
// and the time we try to create it. It can be safely ignored.
if ('code' in e && e.code === '23505') {
return
}
throw e
} finally {
await dataSource.destroy()
}
}
...
async update(keys: Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }> | string[], updateOptions?: UpdateOptions): Promise<void> {
if (keys.length === 0) {
return
}
const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()
const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()
const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName)
const updatedAt = await this.getTime()
const { timeAtLeast, groupIds: _groupIds } = updateOptions ?? {}
if (timeAtLeast && updatedAt < timeAtLeast) {
throw new Error(`Time sync issue with database ${updatedAt} < ${timeAtLeast}`)
}
// Handle both new format (objects with uid and docId) and old format (strings)
const isNewFormat = keys.length > 0 && typeof keys[0] === 'object' && 'uid' in keys[0]
const keyStrings = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }>).map((k) => k.uid) : (keys as string[])
const docIds = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }>).map((k) => k.docId) : keys.map(() => null)
const groupIds = _groupIds ?? keyStrings.map(() => null)
if (groupIds.length !== keyStrings.length) {
throw new Error(`Number of keys (${keyStrings.length}) does not match number of group_ids (${groupIds.length})`)
}
const recordsToUpsert = keyStrings.map((key, i) => [key, this.namespace, updatedAt, groupId
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x3hf-7cj6-3r4m
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x3hf-7cj6-3r4m
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6464
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/d07186844263bad057008863037466aff7c3390f
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3
Related vulnerabilities
All Supply chain →- HIGHCVE-2026-75911
CodeWhale: Project config `allow_shell` override enables arbitrary shell command execution via cloned repository
- HIGHCVE-2026-75858
CodeWhale: rlm_eval auto-approves arbitrary Python execution, bypassing the user's approval policy (RCE)
- CRITICALCVE-2026-62681
Orval: RCE via OpenAPI path -> unescaped request-URL template literal (backtick breakout)
- CRITICALCVE-2026-62682
Orval: RCE via servers[].url -> unescaped request-URL template literal (with getBaseUrlFromSpecification)
- CRITICALCVE-2026-72717
Orval: Import-time RCE via schema default -> zod module-level template literal
- CRITICALCVE-2026-71869
Orval: Import-time RCE via array-items default -> zod module-level template literal