Summary
OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated build/workflow trigger via git-provider confusion (webhook signature bypass)
Advisory details
Summary
The OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the X-Event-Key header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating.
Impact
An attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The triggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is not scoped to a tenant or namespace, so any auto-build component across the cluster matching the given repository and branch is affected. This can result in unauthorized builds — and, where auto-deploy is configured, unauthorized deployment of attacker-influenced code — and can be used to exhaust build resources through repeated unauthenticated triggering.
The exposure applies to any component with spec.autoBuild: true, regardless of which git provider it declares, wherever the autobuild webhook endpoint is network-reachable.
Patches
Fixed in 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0-rc.2. The fix validates Bitbucket webhooks with HMAC-SHA256 against the configured secret using the same verification path as GitHub, requires a configured, non-empty secret for every provider (a missing secret now rejects the request instead of skipping validation), and requires the authenticated provider to match the git provider configured for the matched component. Upgrading is non-disruptive — no component or webhook configuration changes are required beyond the standard upgrade. Upgrade path: 1.1.x → 1.1.3, 1.0.x and earlier → 1.0.3, 1.2 line → 1.2.0-rc.2 or later.
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/security/advisories/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73840
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4239
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4252
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4253
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/268efd9b762a3f4f72b55d9c1b13dfc55122127b
- https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/8af4a3fc8725fc2d8a9de9611e77278a5c48f978
Related vulnerabilities
All Supply chain →- HIGHCVE-2026-62367
Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover
- HIGHCVE-2026-105741
Langflow: IP Spoofing Bypass via `X-Forwarded-For` Allowing Remote Configuration Write
- HIGHCVE-2026-61428
PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing
- HIGHCVE-2026-56675
9router /v1 APIs has unauthenticated access via reverse proxy locality collapse
- HIGHCVE-2026-86039
libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses
- MEDIUMCVE-2026-102682
Pipecat: Public exposure of Pipecat’s development runner can allow unauthenticated bot session creation