Summary
pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
Advisory details
Summary
When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.
Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.
Root cause
- The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw
path.join(modules, <resolved name>)ininstalling/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706,installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, anddeps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233— without thesafeJoinModulesDirguard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location isnode_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal<name>escapes. - The only resolve-time name gate (
resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing/, so a scoped@x/../..passes.
Steps to reproduce
Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):
npm i pnpm@11.9.0
# host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts
Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):
escape dir is outside the project : true
new file implanted outside node_modules : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***
Remediation
Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82393
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5
Related vulnerabilities
All Supply chain →- MEDIUMCVE-2026-75602
OpenList: Authenticated arbitrary file write via Content-Disposition path traversal in SimpleHttp offline-download tool
- HIGHCVE-2026-81726
NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots
- HIGHGHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv
pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project
- HIGHCVE-2026-55527
praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
- HIGHCVE-2026-64679
Atlantis Workspace Handling has Path Traversal that Allows Out-of-Bounds Directory Deletion/Creation
- HIGHCVE-2026-53951
Copier has a trust-prefix bypass via path traversal that runs tasks unprompted