Résumé
Oauthlib: Timing Attack Vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier Comparison (CWE-208)
Détails de l’avis
Summary
A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the PKCE (RFC 7636) implementation
of the Authorization Code Grant flow. The code_challenge_method_plain function
uses Python's standard == operator for string comparison instead of a
constant-time comparison function, potentially allowing timing-based attacks.
Affected Component
- File:
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py - Functions:
code_challenge_method_plain,code_challenge_method_s256 - Vulnerability Type: CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)
Technical Details
Python's == operator uses short-circuit evaluation when comparing strings:
- Returns
Falseimmediately if lengths differ - Compares characters left-to-right, stopping at first mismatch
This means comparison time varies linearly with the length of the common prefix between the attacker-supplied verifier and the stored challenge, creating a measurable timing oracle.
Proof of Concept
Tested locally against oauthlib source (network jitter eliminated to isolate pure Python execution time):
| Input | Result | Time (10M iterations) |
|---|---|---|
Wrong first char (B + A*49) |
Fast reject | 0.34106s |
49 chars correct (A*49 + B) |
Deep compare | 0.37847s |
| Difference | 0.03741s |
The ~37ms delta over 10M iterations corresponds to nanosecond-level differences per call, which are statistically exploitable under controlled conditions.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker intercepts
authorization_codevia Custom URI Scheme Hijacking - PKCE blocks token request — attacker lacks
code_verifier - Attacker sends repeated requests to
/tokenendpoint measuring response times - Using timing oracle, attacker recovers
code_verifiercharacter by character - Attacker obtains Access Token → Account Takeover
Note: Practical exploitability is limited due to the single-use nature of authorization codes and real-world network noise. However, the vulnerable pattern should be corrected as a defense-in-depth measure.
Recommended Fix
Replace == with hmac.compare_digest() for constant-time comparison:
cr: Elvin Latifli
Références
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