Résumé
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BinaryHttpParser should enforce limits for variable lengths fields
Détails de l’avis
We don't enforce any limits for the encoded variable lengths that are used for fields. As the remote peer controls these it's easy for the remote peer to have us buffer data forever and so ultimately OOM.
Références
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