Résumé
Angular SSR: Missing Fallback Raw-Content Serialization Escaping leads to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Détails de l’avis
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server's DOM emulation dependency (domino) when serializing the content of fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, and <noscript>).
When rendering dynamic text content inside fallback raw-content elements via template bindings, the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), domino is configured with scripting enabled, meaning these elements are treated as raw-text elements.
However, domino's serializer previously did not escape text nodes within fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, <noscript>) during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of closing tags in the bound dynamic text was not escaped.
The unescaped closing tag could be serialized directly into the output HTML. When parsed by a browser or re-parsed during SSR post-processing without preserving raw-content parser state, an injected closing tag closes the element early, allowing an injected script block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks against any user visiting an SSR-rendered page that binds user-controlled data inside fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, <noscript>). This can lead to session hijacking, credentials theft, unauthorized actions on behalf of users, and defacement.
Patched Versions
- 22.0.7
- 21.2.19
- 20.3.27
Workarounds
If you cannot immediately update your dependencies, you can mitigate this issue using any of the following approaches:
- Disable critical CSS inlining: Critical CSS inlining in Angular SSR post-processes the rendered HTML using
domino. Disabling this step preventsdominofrom re-parsing and re-serializing the HTML during server-side rendering.- In
angular.json, setinlineCriticaltofalseunder style optimization options:{ "projects": { "my-app": { "architect": { "build": { "builder": "@angular/build:application", "options": { "optimization": { "styles": { "inlineCritical": false } } } } } } } } - When rendering programmatically with
CommonEngine, setinlineCriticalCss: falsein your render options.
- In
- Avoid binding user-controlled values inside fallback raw-content elements (
<iframe>,<noembed>,<noframes>,<noscript>). - Sanitize user input placed inside these elements to explicitly strip or escape closing tags before passing it to the template.
Références
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vpx6-8pjr-4g3v
- https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-vpx6-8pjr-4g3v
- https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69675
- https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69714
- https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69929
- https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69930
- https://github.com/angular/domino/pull/32
- https://github.com/angular/domino/commit/f88e5aa49cf2804d7c2df22ef1640eb4ec43dd56
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